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1
“Can you hear me now?” was an advertising slogan used by Verizon Wireless. Wikipedia,
Verizon Wireless, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verizon_Wireless (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
It was also chanted during a protest over the disabling of cell phone service in the San
Francisco subway. David Kravets, Cellphone Service Stays on During San Francisco Sub-
way Protest, WIRED (Aug. 15, 2011, 11:44 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/08/
anonymous-subway-protest/.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 3, 2011, Charles Blair Hill, a forty-five-year-old “transient,”2 was
shot to death on the Civic Center Station platform of San Francisco’s Bay Area
Rapid Transit (BART) by BART Police Officer3 James Crowell.4 Hill had
reportedly thrown a liquor bottle at Crowell and then lunged at him with a
knife.5 The shooting caused significant criticism of the BART Police Depart-
ment.6 Protesters organized demonstrations on BART railway platforms, which
caused delays of BART trains.7 BART police responded with riot control
tactics.8
More than a month after the shooting, BART police remained concerned
about “surprise demonstrations” on the platforms.9 The prolonged alert was due
to a posting on a “protest website” that suggested demonstrators should “mobil-
ize without public announcement” to take BART by surprise and prevent an
organized police response.10 On August 11, 2011, in anticipation of such a
“flash mob”11 protest, BART officials “temporarily interrupted [wireless] ser-
vice” at some train stations.12 This tactic was intended to prevent protesters’
ability to coordinate via mobile communication devices and therefore lessen
their disruptive efforts.13
2 See Kevin Fagan, Man Killed by BART Officer Identified as Transient, 45, S.F. CHRON.,
July 8, 2011, at C2; see also Matthai Kuruvila, BART Releases Video of Fatal Shooting by
Cop, S.F. CHRON., July 21, 2011, at C4.
3 BART has a police department that is separate and distinct from the San Francisco Police
Department. See BART Police, BART, http://www.bart.gov/about/police/index.aspx (last
visited Jan. 3, 2013); see also SFPD Report System, S.F. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.sf-
police.org/index.aspx?page=778 (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
4 Demian Bulwa, Officer Who Shot Transient Waiting to Join FBI, S.F. CHRON., July 27,
2011, at C2.
5 Id.
6 Zusha Elinson & Shoshana Walter, Latest BART Shooting Prompts New Discussion of
Reforms, NYTIMES.COM (July 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/us/17bcbart.
html ?pagewanted=all. The Hill shooting was not the first time BART officials dealt with
criticism over the use of force by one of its officers. The BART Police Department previ-
ously faced criticism when, on New Year’s Day in 2009, a BART Police Officer shot and
killed an unarmed man. A jury subsequently convicted the officer of involuntary manslaugh-
ter for the shooting. Jack Leonard, Former BART Officer Convicted of Involuntary Man-
slaughter, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/08/local/la-me-
bart-verdict-20100709.
7 Kelly Zito, Shooting Protest Disrupts Service, S.F. CHRON., July 12, 2011, at C1.
8 See sources cited supra note 6.
9 Demian Bulwa & Justin Berton, BART on Alert—But No Protests, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 12,
2011, at C4.
10 Id.
11 See infra text accompanying note 52 (discussing the history of the term “flash mob”).
12 Statement on Temporary Wireless Service Interruption in Select BART Stations on Aug.
11, BART (Aug. 12, 2011, 1:08 PM), http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news201108
12.aspx.
13 Id.
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This tactic immediately drew harsh criticism.14 Some commentators com-
pared BART officials to Middle Eastern “despots.”15 Others wondered whether
there was (or should be) a constitutional right to cellular telephone service.16
Most, if not all, of the critics decried BART’s actions as an unconstitutional
interference with the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.17
Along with the free speech implications,18 BART’s tactic raises another,
less obvious but no less important (and thus far, largely overlooked) constitu-
tional issue: federalism. Federal law prohibits, with few exceptions, interfer-
ence with radio signals—a term that encompasses cellular telephone signals.19
One exception permits agencies of the United States government to interfere
with these signals.20 Notably absent from the federal law, however, is any simi-
lar exception for state or local governments—despite the potential usefulness of
such interference for state and local law enforcement. This Note examines
whether prohibiting states from interfering with cellular telephone signals
encroaches into the general “police power” of the states, in violation of the
federalism principles embodied in the Tenth Amendment. In light of the numer-
ous useful applications of “cell phone jamming”21 in areas of traditional and
important state law enforcement, this Note argues that it does.22
14 Will Reisman, As Criticism Mounts, BART Stays the Course, S.F. EXAMINER (Aug. 16,
2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2011/08/criticism-mounts-bart-stays-
course.
15 See Bill Palmer, Unconstitutional: San Francisco BART Cellphone Shutdown Arrest-
Worthy, BEATWEEK MAG. (Aug. 13, 2011), http://www.beatweek.com/blog/8942-unconstitu-
tional-san-francisco-bart-cellphone-shutdown-arrest-worthy/; see also Cynthia Wong, Wel-
come to San Francisco—Next Stop, Cairo?, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Aug. 23,
2011), http://www.cdt.org/blogs/cynthia-wong/238welcome-san-francisco-next-stop-cairo.
16 John Wildermuth, Is Cellular Service a New Right?, FOX & HOUNDS (Aug. 19, 2011),
http://www.foxandhoundsdaily.com/2011/08/9340-is-cellular-service-a-new-right/.
17 See Letter from Abdi Soltani, Exec. Dir. & Alan Schlosser, Legal Dir., ACLU of N. Cal.,
to Kenton W. Rainey, BART Chief of Police (Aug. 15, 2011), available at http://www.
aclunc.org/docs/aclu_letter_to_bart_chief_of_police_-_aug_15_2011.pdf; David Kravets,
San Francisco Subway Shuts Cell Service to Foil Protest; Legal Debate Ignites, WIRED
(Aug. 15, 2011, 3:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/08/subway-internet-shut-
tering/; Carl Ford, Was BART Crowded Theater Worthy of Shutting Down Cell Service?,
M2M (Aug. 17, 2011), http://m2m.tmcnet.com/topics/m2mevolution/articles/208791-bart-
crowded-theater-worthy-shutting-down-cell-service.htm; Patrik Jonsson, To Defuse “Flash”
Protest, BART Cuts Riders’ Cell Service. Is That Legal?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 12,
2011; contra Steven Luo, BART Cell Shutdown Unconstitutional? Not So Fast, CAL. BEAT
(Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.californiabeat.org/2011/08/21/bart-cell-shutdown-unconstitu-
tional-not-so-fast.
18 For purposes of this note, I assume that such action is constitutional as a reasonable
“time, place and manner” restriction of speech. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
575–76 (1941).
19 See 47 U.S.C. § 302a(a) (2006); see also infra p. 262 and note 30.
20 47 U.S.C. § 302a(c).
21 This Note will use the colloquial terms “jamming,” for intentional interference with a
signal, and “jammer,” for devices or persons who intentionally interfere with a signal.
22 This Note does not address the practical concern of whether the federal government may
be able to prevent states from jamming cell phones through its other powers, such as by
“buying” compliance with its spending power. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
206–07 (1987).
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Section II of this Note examines the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, and its prohibition against “interference” with radio signals. The sec-
tion also discusses the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) enforce-
ment of the prohibition. Specifically, it highlights the lack of an exemption for
state and local governments and the FCC’s express endorsement of the position
that non-federal law enforcement entities are prohibited from jamming cellular
telephone signals.
Section III of this Note examines several uses of cellular telephone jam-
ming technology that are beneficial to law enforcement and have great potential
to improve public safety. Among these are crowd and riot control (as BART’s
application intended); use during tactical enforcement operations, such as war-
rant execution and standoffs; deployment as a preventative measure by bomb
squads and during “executive protection” operations; and use in prisons. This
section argues that each of these applications falls squarely within areas of
traditional state police power.
Section IV presents a brief summary of federalism and a review of histori-
cal and modern Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. The section concludes with
an examination of the concept of the states’ “general police powers” and the
responsibility of the states to provide for the public safety. This section’s in-
depth examination is necessary to demonstrate that although the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment has shifted markedly between
two opposing positions, the principles that support this Note’s supposition
remain constant. This section provides the framework for analyzing whether
the federal government has encroached on state sovereignty.
Section V presents the argument that by prohibiting states from jamming
cellular telephones—even in narrow, law enforcement applications—the fed-
eral government has overstepped its authority and encroached upon powers
“reserved to the States.”23 This final section also addresses and disputes some
of the arguments espoused in opposition of state and local cell phone jamming.
It concludes with the proposition that, in denying states an important mecha-
nism for exercising their traditional police powers, Congress exceeded its enu-
merated powers and the federal law impermissibly interferes with state
sovereignty in violation of the federalist principle of the Tenth Amendment.
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act (“the Act”) and Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt signed it into law.24 The law created the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) and made the agency responsible for
enforcement of the law.25 The Act, codified in Title 47 of United States Code,
was intended to “regulat[e] interstate . . . commerce in communication by wire
23 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
24 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151–62 (2006)); see also Communications Act of 1934, NEXT NEW DEAL: BLOG
OF THE ROOSEVELT INST. (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/communications-act-
1934.
25 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 § 1.
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and radio.”26 The law also sought to make such communication “available, so
far as possible, to all the people of the United States.”27 Notably, in 1937, the
law was updated to reflect that a purpose of the Act was to “promot[e] safety of
life and property through the use of . . . radio communication.”28
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 amended the Act to account for the
significant technological advances that had occurred during the sixty-two-year
interim, particularly the advent and proliferation of mobile communication
devices, i.e., “cell phones.”29 Because cell phones operate essentially as
advanced radios, provisions of the Act govern them.30
The Act and its implementing regulations contain several provisions that
are designed to prohibit interference with radio signals. First, section 301
declares that the United States maintains control “over all the channels of radio
transmission.”31 To ensure that control, the law states further that “[n]o person
shall use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or communi-
cations or signals by radio . . . except under and in accordance” with the Act.32
Next, section 302a(b) states: “No person shall manufacture, import, sell,
offer for sale, . . . ship[,] . . . or use devices, which fail to comply with regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to this section.”33 To comply with the regulations, a
device must be “authorized by the [FCC]”;34 however, the FCC maintains
“[j]ammers, by definition, can never be authorized because they are designed to
interfere with authorized radio communications.”35
Finally, while sections 301 and 302a restrict access to, use of, and licens-
ing of devices that are capable of interfering with radio signals, section 333
deals directly with interference itself. It states, “No person shall willfully or
maliciously interfere with or cause interference to any radio communications of
any station licensed or authorized by [the FCC].”36 All legitimate cell phone
service providers are licensed and authorized by the FCC.37 A violation of sec-
tion 333 is punishable by fine and imprisonment.38
26 47 U.S.C. § 151.
27 Id.
28 Pub. L. No. 97, 50 Stat. 189 (1937) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–62).
29 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
30 See 47 C.F.R. § 22.99 (2011) (defining “Cellular Radiotelephone Service” and “Cellular
system”). Of course, besides cell phones, the law also covers devices that use “Public Mobile
Services,” such as tablets and computers with wireless connectivity. Id.
31 47 U.S.C. § 301.
32 Id.
33 47 U.S.C. § 302a(b).
34 47 C.F.R. § 2.803(a)(1).
35 FCC, Enforcement Advisory No. 2011-03, Cell Jammers, GPS Jammers, and Other Jam-
ming Devices, 26 FCC Rcd. 1327, 1327–28 (Feb. 9, 2011) [hereinafter FCC, Enforcement
Advisory No. 2011-03].
36 47 U.S.C. § 333.
37 See Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 4, 13, 14 In re CTIA, The Wireless Ass’n, No. 09-
1004 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 7, 2009), ECF No. 2 (explaining requirements the FCC has imposed on
wireless carriers); see also FAQs—Wireless Phones, FCC (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.fcc.
gov/encyclopedia/faqs-wireless-phones#billing (explaining that the FCC handles complaints
about wireless service for cell phone customers).
38 47 U.S.C. § 501.
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These three sections of the Act—301, 302a, and 333—form the basis of
the prohibition of “jamming” cell phone signals. The law, however, contains
two exceptions. The first, of course, is the exception for the United States itself.
Section 302a(c) permits the use of jamming devices by “the Government of the
United States or any agency thereof.”39 The other exception, which is not ger-
mane to this Note, applies to devices intended “solely for export.”40
The FCC has actively publicized the prohibition on manufacturing, adver-
tising, and use of cell phone jammers.41 It has also taken enforcement action
against individuals and companies who have violated the prohibition.42 Indeed,
as the technology proliferates, the FCC has increased its enforcement efforts.43
Although these notices and enforcement actions have been directed almost
exclusively at private parties,44 the FCC has long taken the position that state
and local governments are also prohibited from using cell phone jamming
devices.45 The FCC’s opinion on the matter is clear: “The Communications Act
39 47 U.S.C. § 302a(c); 47 C.F.R. § 2.807(d) (2011).
40 47 U.S.C. § 302a(c). During the “Arab Spring” protests, Egyptian officials suppressed
cell phone communication on a large scale. See infra p. 265 and note 51. While that type of
suppression far exceeds what this Note advocates, it demonstrates the existence of a global
market for cell phone jamming technology and explains the “export” exception. See Alex
White, The Impact of Cell Phone Jamming on the Egypt Conflict, 24–7 PRESSRELEASE.COM
(Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.24-7pressrelease.com/press-release-rss/the-impact-of-cell-phone-
jamming-on-the-egypt-conflict-195425.php.
41 See FCC, Enforcement Advisory No. 2012-02, 27 FCC Rcd. 2309 (Mar. 6, 2012) [herein-
after FCC, Enforcement Advisory No. 2012-02] (“Using or Importing Jammers is Illegal”);
FCC, Enforcement Advisory No. 2011-03, supra note 35, at 1327 (“Marketing or Sale of
Devices Designed to Block, Jam, or Interfere with Authorized Radio Communications is
Strictly Prohibited in the U.S.”); FCC, Public Notice, 20 FCC Rcd. 11134 (June 27, 2005)
(“Sale or Use of Transmitters Designed to Prevent, Jam, or Interfere with Cell Phone Com-
munications is Prohibited in the United States”).
42 See FCC, Letter to Monty Henry, 23 FCC Rcd. 8293 (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter FCC,
Letter to Monty Henry]; Jammer Enforcement, FCC ENCYCLOPEDIA, www.fcc.gov/encyclo-
pedia/jammer-enforcement (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
43 Jamie Barnett, Solutions to Stop Use of Contraband Cell Phones by Prisoners, OFFICIAL
FCC BLOG (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.fcc.gov/blog/solutions-stop-use-contraband-cell-
phones-prisoners; FCC, Enforcement Advisory No. 2011-03, supra note 35, at 1327. The
FCC’s enforcement efforts seem to correspond to an increasing popularity of use of cell
phone jammers by private citizens, annoyed with people who talk on their cell phones in
public and are “too loud.” Meghan Casserly, Are Cell Phone Jammers the Next Big Thing?,
FORBES (Mar. 2, 2012, 11:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/2012/03/
02/are-cell-phone-jammers-the-next-big-thing/.
44 Letter from FCC, to Paul Dubrow, Notice of Unlicensed Operation (Dec. 29, 2011),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/paul-dubrow-martinsburg-wv. The sole exception
was a high school in Illinois. See Letter from FCC, to Stanley Dostal, Johnsburg High
School, Notice of Unlicensed Operation (Mar. 15, 2011), available at http://transition.fcc.
gov/eb/FieldNotices/2003/DOC-305288A1.html. However, there were also reports that the
FCC initiated an investigation into BART’s disabling of cell service. Maria L. LaGanga &
Lee Romney, FCC Probing BART’s Shutdown of Cellphone Service, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16,
2011, 7:17 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/08/fcc-bart-cellphone.html.
45 See FCC, Letter to Monty Henry, supra note 42 at 8295 (“[T]here is no similar exemp-
tion allowing the marketing or sale of unauthorized radio frequency devices to state and local
law enforcement agencies.”). See also FCC, Enforcement Advisory No. 2011-03, supra note
35, at 1327 (“[cell phone jammers] cannot be marketed in the United States (except in the
very limited context of authorized use by the U.S. government).” (emphasis added)); FCC,
GN Docket No. 12-52, Commission Seeks Comment on Certain Wireless Service Interrup-
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does not exempt state or local government officials from the prohibition on
jammers.”46
III. LAW ENFORCEMENT USES OF CELL PHONE JAMMING
Despite the FCC’s aggressive efforts to prevent the unauthorized use of
cell phone jamming equipment, there are several potential law enforcement
uses of such technology. As mentioned above, these uses include: 1) crowd and
riot control to limit the ability of violent or ill-intentioned protesters to coordi-
nate their actions; 2) tactical enforcement operations, such as warrant execution
and standoffs, to prevent communication between the subjects of such enforce-
ment and outside parties; 3) deployment by bomb squads to prevent the “com-
mand detonation”47 of cell phone-activated explosive devices during render-
safe procedures; 4) use during “executive protection,” also to prevent attacks by
cell phone-activated explosive devices; and 5) in prisons and jails to prevent the
use of contraband cell phones by inmates. Each of these is discussed in detail
below.
A. Crowd Control
Although state and local authorities have dealt with unruly crowds for
hundreds of years,48 cell phones add a new dimension of uncertainty to riot
control, as seen with the BART protest planning. But because that was appar-
ently the first attempt by an American law enforcement agency to suppress cell
phone signals to try to prevent the coordinated efforts of demonstrators, it
remains unclear whether the tactic is effective.49 The protest that BART hoped
to thwart did not occur, but little evidence suggests that this was due to the
tions, 27 FCC Rcd. 2177, 2178 (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_
public/attachmatch/DA-12-311A1.pdf [hereinafter FCC, GN Docket No. 12-52] (seeking
comment on deactivation of networks controlled by governmental agencies but maintaining
that signal jamming is always illegal); FCC, Enforcement Advisory No. 2012-02, supra note
41, at 2309 (illegal to operate jammers in U.S. “[u]nless you are an authorized federal gov-
ernment user”) (emphasis added).
46 Enforcement Bureau, GPS, Wi-Fi, and Cell Phone Jammers Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQs), FCC, http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/jammerenforcement/jamfaq.pdf (last visited Jan. 3,
2013). In March 2012, the FCC sought public comment as it considered whether to issue
“legal or policy guidance” in response to BART’s disabling of cell phone service. FCC, GN
Docket No. 12-52, supra note 45, at 2178–79. However, perhaps in light of BART’s volun-
tary adoption of a restrictive policy regarding the tactic and the FCC’s own recognition that
“[t]he legal and policy issues raised by the type of wireless service interruption at issue here
are significant and complex,” the FCC has not taken any legal action against BART. Press
Release, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski’s Statement on BART Policy Adoption, (Dec.
1, 2011), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-311310A1.
pdf.
47 Command detonation refers to common law enforcement terminology for detonation by
the bomber (as opposed to “victim-activated” or “timed” devices). See, e.g., EL PASO CNTY.
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 6 (2005); see also John Pike, Impro-
vised Explosive Devices (IEDs)—Iraq, GLOBAL SECURITY (May 7, 2011, 2:59 AM), http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ied-iraq.htm.
48 See PAUL A. GILJE, RIOTING IN AMERICA 1 (1996).
49 Kravets, supra note 17.
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denial of cell phone service on the BART platform.50 Foreign governments
have used telecommunication blackouts but on a scale so large as to arguably
amount to tyranny, far exceeding the authority advocated in this Note, and ulti-
mately still with questionable effectiveness.51 Nonetheless, the relatively recent
phenomena of “flash mobs” and the experiences of U.K. authorities (not just
the United Kingdom but also the University of Kentucky, as explained below)
show some potential usefulness in controlling such communication.
The term “flash mob” was first used in 2003 to describe a spontaneous
gathering of people, coordinated by text messaging, e-mail, and Internet post-
ings, for a frivolous purpose.52 More recently, these gatherings have been coor-
dinated through social media services such as Facebook and Twitter.53 Some of
the more entertaining flash mob incidents involved a choreographed dance rou-
tine in a Las Vegas casino,54 a pillow fight in New York’s Union Square (and
elsewhere throughout the world),55 a hundred “single ladies” paying homage to
a Beyonce´ music video in London’s Piccadilly Circus,56 and a lightsaber battle
in a shopping center.57
Recent events, however, demonstrate that such organized gatherings are
not always for innocent purposes. For instance, police in California, Illinois,
Washington, D.C., Nevada, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey,
Ohio, and elsewhere have responded to sudden gatherings of people engaging
in theft or robbery (so called “flash robs”), assault, and vandalism or damage to
50 Bulwa & Berton, supra note 9.
51 Dan Murphy, Egypt Shuts Down Internet, Rounds Up Opposition Leaders as Protests
Start, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Back
channels/2011/0128/Egypt-shuts-down-Internet-rounds-up-opposition-leaders-as-protests-
start. See also Anjali Mullany, Like Iran & Tunisia, Egypt Protests Fueled by Social Sites
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube Amid Censoring, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 28, 2011), http://
articles.nydailynews.com/2011-01-28/news/27738237_1_election-protests-protest-harass-
ment-neda-agha-soltan; Marko Papic & Sean Noonan, Social Media as a Tool for Protest,
STRATFOR (Feb. 3, 2011, 9:54 AM), http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110202-social-
media-tool-protest.
52 Judith A. Nicholson, FCJ-030 Flash! Mobs in the Age of Mobile Connectivity, 6
FIBRECULTURE J. (Dec. 10, 2005), http://six.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-030-flash-mobs-in-
the-age-of-mobile-connectivity/.
53 See Eric Tucker & Thomas Watkins, More Flash Mobs Gather with Criminal Intent,
NBC NEWS.COM (Aug. 9, 2011, 2:54 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44077826/ns/
technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/more-flash-mobs-gather-criminal-intent/; Rick
Jervis, “Flash Mobs” Pose Challenge to Police Tactics, USA TODAY (AUG. 19, 2011, 9:37
AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-08-18-flash-mobs-police_n.htm.
54 Shaycarl, Phamous Planet Hollywood Flash Mob, YOUTUBE (Nov. 30, 2009), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=C18p7QIbWqc.
55 Anjali Athavaley, Students Unleash a Pillow Fight on Manhattan, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15,
2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120814163599712081.html.
56 FLASH MOB: Beyonce “Single Ladies” in Picadilly Square, DANCING VIDEOS BLOG
(Apr. 25, 2009, 10:31 PM), http://dancingvideos.wordpress.com/2009/04/25/flash-mob-
beyonce-belgian-train-station-picadilly-square/.
57 Daily Mail Reporter, May the Force Be with You: It’s Every Man for Himself as Hun-
dreds of Star Wars Fans Stage Lightsaber Battle Flashmob, MAIL ONLINE (Feb. 24, 2010,
6:34 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1253528/Its-man-Star-Wars-lightsaber-
battle-flashmob-breaks-Bristol-town-centre.html.
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property.58 However, whether social media and mobile communication played
a role in organizing these events remains uncertain.59 Further, even assuming
the participants used mobile communication to organize these gatherings, it is
debatable whether cell phone jamming in a limited geographical area would
have had any positive impact in preventing these actions. It seems likely that at
least a large part of the organization occurred in advance of the gathering, while
participants were still outside the targeted area where police would jam cell
phone signals. For example, consider that the disruptive protest that BART
authorities anticipated was actually suggested on a website well before the
gathering was to occur.60
Nonetheless, when authorities know in advance about a planned gathering,
it is plausible that suppressing mobile communication in those areas could
enable authorities to inhibit the spread of violence and mitigate any coordinated
and active resistance to police engaged in crowd control. At least, that is the
opinion of many in the United Kingdom, where in August 2011, violent riots
occurred in cities across the nation.61 Social media services, particularly Black-
Berry Messenger and Twitter, were blamed for helping spread the chaos.62
Several people were even convicted for using Facebook to attempt to incite
58 See Police Crack Down on Mobbing Thefts, NBC BAYAREA (Aug. 3, 2009, 3:15 PM),
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Police-Crack-Down-On-Mobbing-Thefts-52382167.
html; Annie Vaughn, Teenage Flash Mob Robberies on the Rise, FOXNEWS.COM (June 18,
2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/06/18/top-five-most-brazen-flash-mob-robberies/;
Michael Sheridan, 100 Teens Turn Snowball Fight into Violent Flash Mob Outside Philadel-
phia Macy’s Store, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Feb. 17, 2010, 11:42 AM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/news/national/100-teens-turn-snowball-fight-violent-flash-mob-philadelphia-
macy-store-article-1.199664; Ian Urbina, Mobs Are Born as Word Grows by Text Message,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/us/25mobs.html; Ray
Rivera & Colin Moynihan, An Unwelcome Easter Custom in Times Square: Violence, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/nyregion/06timessq.html; Cotton
Delo, MSSO Convenes Meeting to Discuss “Flash Mob”, S. ORANGE PATCH (Mar. 25,
2010), http://southorange.patch.com/articles/msso-convenes-meeting-to-discuss-flash-mob;
Lindsay Betz, Six Girls Arrested After 100-Person Riot at Severance Town Center in Cleve-
land Heights, SUN PRESS (Feb. 18, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/sunpress/
2010/02/six_girls_arrested_after_100-p.html.
59 Mark Milian, Little Evidence Links Mob Violence to Social Media, CNN (Aug. 19, 2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-19/tech/flash.mob.violence_1_flash-mob-social-media-mob-
violence?_s=PM:TECH.
60 Bulwa & Berton, supra note 9.
61 James Ball, Two-Thirds Support Social Networking Blackout in Future Riots, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/nov/08/two-thirds-support-social-
media-blackout. See also UK Riots 2011, GUARDIAN, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/london-
riots (last visited Jan. 3, 2013) (providing comprehensive coverage of the London riots).
62 See Josh Halliday, London Riots: How BlackBerry Messenger Played a Key Role,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2011, 7:24 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/aug/08/london-
riots-facebook-twitter-blackberry?INTCMP=SRCH; William Lee Adams, Were Twitter or
BlackBerrys Used to Fan Flames of London’s Riots?, TIME (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.time.
com/time/world/article/0,8599,2087337,00.html; Josh Halliday, David Cameron Considers
Banning Suspected Rioters from Social Media, GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2011, 8:01 AM), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/aug/11/david-cameron-rioters-social-media; Mathew
Ingram, Network Effects: Social Media’s Role in the London Riots, BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 8,
2011), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/network-effects-social-medias-role-in-the-
london-riots-08082011.html.
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rioters.63 The British prime minister said that the public would be “struck by
how [the riots] were organised [sic] via social media” and that police and intel-
ligence services were exploring how to prevent such misuse in the future.64
And consider that in the early morning hours of April 3, 2012, after the
University of Kentucky won the NCAA Championship,65 a Twitter feed report-
ing the Lexington Police Department’s real-time, street-level response to the
ensuing riots and mayhem became the most followed Twitter topic in the
world.66 While many followers may have tuned in simply for entertainment,
one can envision the potential exploitation of such information by rioters intent
on resisting police.
B. Warrant Execution
States have a long history of serving search warrants,67 but no accurate
statistic exists to account for the total number of search warrants that state and
local authorities execute every year.68 The figure is undoubtedly in the
thousands, probably the tens of thousands.69 Add to that the number of arrest
warrants that involve forced entry into a residence and the total number of
times police forcibly enter residences each year grows. Preventing advance
notice to the target is a primary concern for ensuring safety and preservation of
evidence during these operations.70 In an unpublished case from the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the court held that it was not unreasonable for police to force entry into a
residence after waiting only eight to ten seconds because the investigation that
preceded the warrant indicated the suspects “use[d] their cellular telephones
63 Hugo Gye, Judge: No Reprieve for the Two Facebook Rioters Who Used Networking Site
to Incite Violence, MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 19, 2011, 1:44 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-2050455/Facebook-UK-riots-inciters-told-4-year-sentences-WERE-fair.html.
64 England Riots: Government Mulls Social Media Controls, BBC NEWS (Aug. 11, 2011,
9:57 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14493497.
65 Again! Go Cats!
66 Chris Greenberg, Kentucky Fans Riot: Shooting, Fires, Arrests Occur as Twitter Focuses
on Lexington Police Scanner, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2012/04/03/kentucky-fans-riot-shooting-lexington-police-scanner_n_13991
01.html.
67 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Williams, 814 N.W.2d 460, 466–67 (2012) (discussing the history
of search warrants in Wisconsin).
68 See, e.g., Mike Donoghue, Oversight Virtually Absent with Warrants, BURLINGTON FREE
PRESS (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/article/20111113/NEWS02/111
130341/Oversight-virtually-absent-warrants.
69 In 2011, Vermont authorities alone served almost 900 search warrants. See ACLU OF
VERMONT, SEARCH WARRANTS FILED IN VERMONT CRIMINAL DIVISION CALENDAR YEAR
2011 (2011); see also Mike Donoghue, Vermont Supreme Court Orders Warrant Changes,
BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Jan. 25, 2012, 2:50 PM), http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/
article/20120125/NEWS03/120125001/Vermont-Supreme-Court-orders-warrant-changes
(discussing the fact that there was no evidence in 396 of the 1,273 cases that Vermont crimi-
nal courts issued warrants for). This accounting was conducted in response to criticized lack
of search warrants oversight in Vermont. See supra note 68.
70 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981) (“[T]he execution of a warrant to search
for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts
to conceal or destroy evidence.”). See also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978)
(“The pre-search proceeding is necessarily ex parte, since the subject of the search cannot be
tipped off to the application for a warrant lest he destroy or remove evidence.”).
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constantly” and led to a valid concern that the suspects could be warned of the
imminent police action.71
Allowing police to discreetly deploy cell phone jamming equipment at a
residence in advance of the execution of a warrant reduces the likelihood that
someone who learned of the imminent enforcement or observed law enforce-
ment officers gathering in the area could alert the target to their presence. The
jamming would enhance the safety of the officers serving the warrant and
reduce the likelihood of destruction of evidence. It would also enhance the
safety of the occupants who, caught by surprise, would be less likely to resist
police.
C. Standoffs
Similar to the execution of search warrants, no reliable statistics exist
regarding the number of “standoffs” and hostage-takings to which state and
local police respond each year. During these incidents, police typically try to
limit the subject’s ability to communicate with outside parties.72 Historically,
police departments worked with local telephone companies to accomplish this
by disabling phone service to the building where the suspect was located and
then using a dedicated “throw phone” to communicate with the suspect.73 Cell
phone technology, however, makes limiting outside communication more diffi-
cult, as a recent incident in Utah demonstrates.
On June 17, 2011, police in Ogden, Utah, attempted to arrest Jason Valdez
after he failed to appear in court.74 Instead of surrendering to police, Valdez,
who was armed, barricaded himself in a hotel room, along with a female whom
police described as a hostage.75 For the next sixteen hours, Valdez held the
police at bay while he used his cell phone to post updates to his Facebook
profile.76 He even changed his status to “currently in a standoff.”77 When one
of Valdez’s Facebook “friends” warned him that a police officer was hiding in
the bushes outside the hotel, Valdez posted his gratitude for the information:
“Thank you homie.”78 Valdez even used his cell phone to take a picture of
himself with his hostage and post it to Facebook.79
This scenario exemplifies the need to be able to employ cell phone jam-
ming technology during a standoff. When police limit a suspect’s access to
communication with others, they command greater control of situations. By
denying violent offenders’ access to information, such as police locations and
planned tactics, police enhance their own safety and effectiveness. They may
gain additional time to negotiate, for instance, by preventing a suicidal subject
71 Jama v. City of Seattle, 446 F. App’x 865, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2011).
72 Laurence Miller, Hostage Negotiations: Psychological Strategies for Resolving Crises,
POLICEONE.COM (May 22, 2007), http://www.policeone.com/standoff/articles/1247470-Hos-
tage-negotiations-Psychological-strategies-for-resolving-crises/.
73 Id.
74 Jennifer Dobner, Utah Man Used Facebook During Standoff, ASSOC. PRESS (June 22,
2011, 9:23 AM), http://usatoday30.com/tech/news/2011-06-22-facebook-standoff_n.htm.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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from “saying goodbye” as a final act before killing himself or others. When
authorities can isolate subjects, negotiators are able to use traditional psycho-
logical techniques to work towards peaceful resolutions.
D. Bomb Squads
Local police have dealt with illegal bombs since at least the late 1800s.80
The New York Police Department created the first dedicated unit for dealing
with bombs in 1903.81 Since that time, the sophistication of bombs—and the
response to them—has evolved.82 Authorities around the world are increas-
ingly confronted with bombs that are remotely activated by cell phone detona-
tors.83 Such devices present unique challenges for the officers who must
respond to them, particularly when those devices are discovered intact, before
detonation. The U.S. military has used cell phone jamming technology for
years to counter such devices.84 Military convoy vehicles are equipped with
devices to prevent the remote detonation of roadside bombs.85 Employing jam-
ming signals near the bomb prevents the bomber from remotely activating it
because the signal cannot reach the detonator.
Cell phone jamming technology has the same useful application for state
and local bomb squads, which are responsible for responding to and safely
disposing of bombs found in their jurisdictions. Reducing the likelihood of a
remote detonation enhances the safety of both the bomb technician and the
community. Once the risk of detonation is neutralized, explosive devices can be
rendered safe, preserving potential evidence and preventing destruction of
property. However, unless those squads are “deputized” by a federal agency,
80 See Territory v. Reuss, 5 P. 885, 888 (Mont. 1885) (Coburn, J., dissenting) (“[T]he sher-
iff . . . saw the fragments of the . . . bomb. He took charge of them, and kept them in his
office.”); Spies v. People (The Anarchists’ Case), 12 N.E. 865, 869 (Ill. 1887) (defendants
advocated violent overthrow of the government and suggested that “bombs should be thrown
into the police stations, and the police shot . . . as they came out.”); People v. Stites, 17 P.
693, 695 (Cal. 1888) (Defendant “observing that he was being followed by the
officers . . . surreptitiously deposited the bomb.”).
81 Kareem Fahim, Bomb Squad Has Hard-Won Expertise, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2010), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/nyregion/03squad.html?_r=0.
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., Drew Griffin & Kathleen Johnston, Toronto Bomb Plotters Sentenced; Alleged
Mastermind Gets Life, CNN (Jan. 18, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-18/justice/
canada.bomb.plotters_1_zakaria-amara-sentencing-hearing-terrorist-group?_s=PM:CRIME;
Maria Ressa, Philippines’ Evolving Terrorism Threat, CNN (Jan. 31, 2011), http://articles.
cnn.com/2011-01-31/opinion/maria.ressa.bus.bombing_1_al-qaeda-al-khobar-bus-bombing;
Death Toll Climbs to 5 in Bus Bombing, CNN (Jan. 26, 2011, 3:14 AM), http://www.cnn.
com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/01/26/philippines.bus.bomb/index.html; John Pike, Madrid
Train Bombing, GLOBAL SECURITY (July 13, 2011, 12:49 PM), http://www.globalsecurity.
org/security/ops/madrid.htm.
84 Noah Shachtman, The Secret History of Iraq’s Invisible War, WIRED (June 14, 2011, 4:00
AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/iraqs-invisible-war/.
85 See id.; see also JAMMERALL, http://www.jammerall.com/products/VIP-Protection-High-
Output-Power-Signal-Jammer-%28800W%29.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013) (advertising a
product for such use).
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they cannot legally use cell phone jamming countermeasures and must simply
face the potential remote detonation of the bomb.86
E. Executive Protection
For most people, the idea of government bodyguards immediately brings
to mind the United States Secret Service. But state and local law enforcement
agencies have similar, if lesser known, “executive protection” or “dignitary
protection” missions. Historically, state law enforcement agencies have been
responsible for ensuring the safety of governors. In Virginia, police have pro-
tected that state’s governors since 1618, when the Virginia Capitol Police force
was established to protect the governor from the “hostile Indian population.”87
Even the police departments of some large cities have responsibility for pro-
tecting officials and other high-profile people.88
Much like the application by military convoys and bomb squads, cell
phone jamming devices can be deployed during protective assignments to pre-
vent the use of remotely activated bombs targeting the person being pro-
tected.89 Such threats are not limited to war zones. In 2011, authorities in
Spokane, Washington, found a remote-controlled bomb placed along the route
of a planned political march.90 However, while federal agencies such as the
Secret Service can (and do) use cell phone jamming to protect presidents or
their other charges, the same technology is not legally available to state or local
police with similar responsibilities.91
F. Prisons and Jails
Prisons and jails are other areas where cell phone jamming would be use-
ful for state and local authorities. In the recent past, authorities have docu-
mented a huge increase in the possession of “contraband” cell phones by
inmates.92 These smuggled phones93 are not being used only to stay in touch
with loved ones. In 2007, inmates detained in a Baltimore city jail awaiting trial
for one murder, used a smuggled cell phone to arrange another murder, this
86 See Spencer S. Hsu, Local Police Want Right to Jam Wireless Signals, WASH. POST, Feb.
1, 2009, at A02.
87 History, THE DIVISION OF CAPITOL POLICE, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, http://dcp.
virginia.gov/history.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
88 How NYC Mayors are Protected, CBS NEWS (Dec. 22, 2009, 3:35 PM), http://www.
cbsnews.com/2100-250_162-3558935.html.
89 David S. Bennahum, Hope You Like Jamming, Too, SLATE (Dec. 5, 2003, 6:34 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/gizmos/2003/12/hope_you_like_jamming_too.html. See
also JAMMERALL, supra note 85 (advertising a product for such use).
90 Jonathan Dienst, FBI: Bomb Found on MLK March Route, MSNBC (Jan. 18, 2011, 10:18
PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41139894/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/fbi-bomb-
found-mlk-march-route/.
91 Hsu, supra note 86, at A02.
92 See Nat’l Inst. Just., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cell Phones Behind Bars, IN SHORT: TOWARD
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SOLUTIONS 1 (Dec. 2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/227539.
pdf; Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. and Rehab., Contraband Cell Phones in CDCR Prisons and Con-
servation Camps 1 (Feb. 2012), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Contraband-Cell-Phones/docs/Con-
traband-Cell-Phone-Fact-Sheet-January-2012.pdf.
93 Which give new meaning to the term “cell phone”!
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time of a witness who was to testify in the initial murder case.94 In 2008, Texas
inmate Richard Tabler, who was awaiting execution after being convicted of
murdering four people, used a smuggled cell phone to call Texas Senator John
Whitmire and threaten the senator’s daughters.95 Tabler shared the phone with
other inmates on death row, who collectively made about 2,800 calls in the
preceding thirty days.96 Even Charles Manson has been caught with a cell
phone—twice!97
Recognizing the usefulness of cell phone jamming technology in combat-
ting the use of contraband cell phones behind prison walls,98 some prison offi-
cials have appealed to the FCC for permission to install such devices. In 2009,
the Director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DCDOC)
requested approval to test such technology in the D.C. Jail.99 The FCC
acknowledged the “substantial threat to public safety posed by the use of con-
traband mobile phones by inmates.”100 Nonetheless, the FCC maintained that
DCDOC’s use of cell phone jamming to combat this safety threat would be
illegal and denied its request.101
Even some legislators—at both the state and federal levels—believe in the
potential usefulness of cell phone jamming in prisons. In Tennessee, the state
legislature introduced a resolution urging the FCC to permit such jamming.102
In 2009, a congressman from Texas introduced the Safe Prisons Communica-
tions Act of 2009 to the U.S. House of Representatives.103 The legislation
would have amended the Communications Act of 1934 to permit the use of cell
phone jamming technology in prisons.104 The Safe Prisons Communications
Act, however, did not become law.105
94 Press Release, U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Md., Two Defendants Sentenced in the Murder of
Witness Carl Lackl (July 9, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/md/Public-
Affairs/press_releases/press08/TwoDefendantsSentencedintheMurderofWitnessCarlLackl.
html.
95 Death Row Killer Threatens Texas Senator Via Cellphone, USA TODAY (Oct. 21, 2008,
9:06 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-10-21-inmate-senator-threats_
N.htm.
96 Id.
97 Michael Winter, Charles Manson Caught Again with Cellphone in Prison, USA TODAY
(Feb. 03, 2011), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/02/hello-
satan-charles-manson-caught-again-with-cellphone-in-prison/1#.UHJYIkLC5UR.
98 See Prison, THE SIGNAL JAMMER, http://www.thesignaljammer.com/categories/Prison/
(last visited Jan. 3, 2013) (advertising products specifically for use in prisons).
99 FCC, Letter to Mr. Devon Brown, 24 FCC Rcd. 2060 (Feb. 18, 2009).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 2060–61.
102 H.R.J. Res. 685, 106th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2009).
103 Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009, H.R. 560, 111th Cong. (2009). For a detailed
discussion and critique of the proposed law see Jane C. Christie, Comment, Disconnected:
The Safe Prisons Communications Act Fails to Address Prison Communications, 51
JURIMETRICS J. 17 (2010).
104 Id. at 17.
105 Bill Summary & Status, LIBR. OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:
h.r.00560: (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
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IV. FEDERALISM, THE TENTH AMENDMENT, AND STATES’ POLICE POWERS
To make the argument that the Communications Act of 1934 is unconsti-
tutional, at least to the extent that it prohibits states from jamming cell phones
in the circumstances described above, it is necessary to examine how the Con-
stitution divides power between the federal and state governments. Because this
division is embodied in the Tenth Amendment, it is helpful to examine the
history of Supreme Court interpretation of the amendment. Doing so reveals
that, despite the uncertain nature of the Tenth Amendment itself, there is certain
and inviolable, sovereign state “police” power that underlies it. From this
power springs the states’ inextinguishable authority to jam cell phone signals.
A. Federalism
Federalism is a central tenet of the government created by our Constitu-
tion.106 This federalist structure, with a separation of governing powers
between a central, federal government and the governments of the states, is
implicit in the Constitution’s assignment of power.107 This implication flows
from the supreme—but limited—powers granted by the Constitution to the fed-
eral government.108 The Constitution leaves all other powers to the states.109
Consequently, two distinct sovereignties were created, each with its own pow-
ers. So, while the federal government can become very powerful (and has), it
can never be all-powerful because the states have retained an “immense mass
of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State, not
surrendered to the general government.”110
Constitutional federalism has two basic components. The first is the lim-
ited authority of the federal government; Article I of the Constitution limits
Congress’s powers to those “[t]herein granted.”111 Accordingly, the federal
government’s authority is confined to the “enumerated powers” (such as the
powers to tax, regulate commerce, and deal with foreign affairs) expressly
included in the Constitution; it cannot exercise any power beyond them.112 Yet,
this limitation inherently contemplates powers of governance that do fall
outside those enumerated and granted to Congress. Thus, those powers are
impliedly held by the states.
The second element of federalism resides in the “supremacy clause” of
Article VI, which states that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law
of the Land.”113 Where the Constitution grants power to the federal govern-
ment, any law made pursuant to that power is supreme over any contrary law
106 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 3 (4th ed.
2011).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 3–4.
109 Id. at 3.
110 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824).
111 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
112 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
113 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
272 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:257
passed by the states. This also implies that the states have power to create and
enforce laws, though they may not conflict with the federal government’s laws.
Unfortunately, this implied federalism leaves many questions unanswered.
For instance, although the Constitution was clearly intended to limit the federal
government’s powers, it is less clear how limited they were intended to be. The
Constitution permits the federal government to pass “all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper” for executing its enumerated powers.114 Inherently, such
a broad mandate—sometimes called the “sweeping clause” for its breadth—has
the potential to swallow the limitations and make them meaningless.115 This
uncertainty caused great concern and debate during the drafting of the Constitu-
tion.116 Many feared that without an express statement of limitation, the federal
government’s exercise of authority would expand and eventually envelop the
states, leaving them without any power at all and rendering the federalist struc-
ture moot.117 That uncertainty prompted the inclusion of the Tenth Amendment
in the Bill of Rights.118
B. Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment states, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”119 Though relatively straightforward in
its language,120 the Tenth Amendment has had a history of inconsistent inter-
pretation, its significance—and its check on federal power—expanding and
shrinking over time.121 Two competing views, in varying degrees at different
times, predominate its jurisprudential history.122
In United States v. Darby, Justice Stone succinctly and famously summed
up the first view when he wrote that the Tenth Amendment “states but a truism
that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”123 Interpreted this way, the
Tenth Amendment is simply an express textual statement of the federalist prin-
ciple that there are powers beyond those delegated to the central government
114 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
115 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 366 (1819).
116 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison); see also Jack N. Rakove, American
Federalism: Was There an Original Understanding?, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND
STATE SOVEREIGNTY 107, 108–09 (Mark R. Killenbeck ed., 2002); THOMAS B. MCAFFEE,
JAY S. BYBEE & A. CHRISTOPHER BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE
STATES: A HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 41 (2006); RAOUL BERGER,
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 78–81 (1987).
117 Mark R. Killenbeck, No Harm in Such a Declaration?, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND
STATE SOVEREIGNTY 1, 29 (Mark R. Killenbeck ed., 2002); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 106,
at 3; MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 41; BERGER, supra note 116, at
78–79.
118 MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 41.
119 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
120 Indeed, the commentary of McCulloch suggested, “It would seem, that human language
could not furnish words less liable to misconstruction.” 17 U.S. at 366.
121 Even Justice O’Connor noted that the Supreme Court’s “jurisprudence in this area has
traveled an unsteady path.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992).
122 Id. at 155–56.
123 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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that, if not otherwise proscribed, may be exercised by the states;124 the states
have “retained” the powers that were not collectively “surrendered” to central
government upon ratification of the Constitution.125 This view holds that the
Tenth Amendment is not an independent limitation on those powers that are
granted to Congress.126 Rather, it is simply a reminder that the powers
bestowed upon Congress are limited and what remains lies with the states—it
serves no affirmative limiting role beyond admonishing against overreaching.
The alternate view is that the Tenth Amendment actively guards the sover-
eignty of the states;127 it creates an affirmative, protected “zone” of state power
into which the federal government cannot intrude.128 The states “reserved” this
power and the federal government cannot interfere with it.129 By this reasoning,
if a federal law did encroach into this zone, even if it was an otherwise valid
exercise of federal power, it would be unconstitutional for violating the Tenth
Amendment.
At some level, this is a distinction without a difference, a matter of seman-
tics.130 Courts can protect the structure of federalism with or without invoking
the Tenth Amendment. Under both views, federal laws that do not comport
with the federalist structure may still be unconstitutional, although only the
latter view credits the Tenth Amendment with making it so. Under the truism
view espoused by Justice Stone, a federal law may violate the principle stated
in the Tenth Amendment, but it would be invalid under another part of the
Constitution. Conversely, under the “zone” view,131 a federal law could be
unconstitutional for breaching state sovereignty, thereby violating the affirma-
tive protection of the Tenth Amendment itself.
For instance, suppose that under its power to regulate commerce, Congress
passes a law prohibiting interference with cell phones. Theoretically, a court
may find that the scope of the law (which is so expansive it incidentally inter-
feres with the states) exceeds Congress’s power to regulate commerce and is
invalid for going beyond the powers delegated in Article I—as the Court has
noted on multiple occasions, interfering with state sovereignty is not a power
delegated to the federal government.132 Conversely, a court could find that the
law directly interferes with the sovereignty of the states, and therefore violates
124 MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 40.
125 See supra note 116.
126 See supra note 116.
127 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 319.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) (Justice O’Connor noting, “In the
end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one views
the question at issue in these cases as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to
the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of dis-
cerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment.”).
131 The “zone” view could also be called the “radiation” view, based on Justice Holmes’s
statement regarding “some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amend-
ment.” Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
132 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355,
2366 (2011).
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and is invalid under the Tenth Amendment. The result is the same even if the
approach is different.
Despite this ability to protect federalism under either view of the Tenth
Amendment, as the Supreme Court has shifted between the two views, so too
has the extent to which the federal government has been able to interfere with
state power.133 The section below traces the historical ebbs and flows of the
constitutional history of Tenth Amendment interpretation. In so doing, it
reveals that, even during periods embracing the truism view—when state
power has been at its weakest—the Court has always recognized and acknowl-
edged that such state power exists. What this history has failed to do, however,
is divine where the line between federal and state power lies. This Note argues
that, regardless of where the divide is, the power of the states to jam cell phone
signals in public safety exigencies falls well within the power undoubtedly
reserved by the states and is beyond the reach of Congress.
i. Nineteenth Century
As noted above, courts can address federalism without relying on the
Tenth Amendment. This has particularly been the case during periods when the
“truism” view predominates and the Tenth Amendment figured less promi-
nently in the Court’s thinking. From a historical perspective, it is important to
consider the development of Congress’s powers, especially its “commerce”
power, from which most federal authority springs today.134 This power has
been most likely to intrude into state sovereignty—indeed, it is the power upon
which the Communications Act is based135—and it has played a part in many
federalism rulings.136 Such decisions have had a profound impact on how we
understand the Tenth Amendment now.
The Court’s earliest decisions implicating federalism took the “truism”
view of the Tenth Amendment. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Mar-
shall addressed the extent of the federal government’s power and the states’
own power to resist it.137 He set the bar very high: states had no power to
“retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the consti-
tutional laws enacted by [C]ongress to carry into execution the powers vested
in the general government.”138 In dismissing a Tenth Amendment argument
133 Compare Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 239–40 (1824), and Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556–57 (1985) (finding Tenth Amendment is not a bar
to federal legislation), with Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273–74 (1918), and Nat’l
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 (finding Tenth Amendment is a bar to federal legislation).
134 MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 87 (2005).
135 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
136 Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the decision
strengthening the Tenth Amendment delivered a “catastrophic judicial body blow at Con-
gress’ power under the Commerce Clause.”).
137 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The Court held that, although the power to
create a national bank was not itself an enumerated power, it was a “necessary and proper”
exercise of Congress’s lawmaking power to execute several enumerated powers. Id. at
420–22.
138 Id. at 436.
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regarding state authority,139 Marshall turned to the supremacy clause of Article
VI and held that when Congress acts pursuant to its constitutional “sphere” of
power, the states are powerless to resist it.140 The Court viewed the Tenth
Amendment as “merely declaratory” and not an express limitation on Con-
gress’s powers.141 Of course, Marshall recognized that the issue of exactly how
far Congress’s granted powers reached “will probably continue to arise, so long
as our system shall exist.”142
In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court continued to view the Tenth Amendment
as merely a declaration of principle when it addressed the breadth of Con-
gress’s power to regulate commerce.143 The Court, of course, emphasized that
the federal government was one of limited powers that were carved out of pow-
ers previously held by the states.144 Also, Marshall recognized that while the
federal government’s powers were limited to those granted to it by the Consti-
tution, the states’ powers consisted of everything else not surrendered.145
Nonetheless, he again took a broad view of the implementation of Congress’s
powers.146 Under Gibbons, where the Constitution grants a power (in that case,
the power to regulate commerce—the same power that underlies the ban on cell
phone jamming), it grants it in its entirety and there is virtually no limit to the
extent which Congress can wield it: “This power, like all others vested in Con-
gress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowl-
edges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”147
Marshall dodged the idea that the Tenth Amendment itself was such a
“limitation[ ] . . . prescribed in the constitution” by reasoning that the power to
regulate commerce was a power surrendered by the states, and no “residuum”
of it was left with them.148 What Gibbons did not adequately resolve, however,
was the conflict between the commerce power, which states had surrendered,
and the raw police power, which they had not.149 And so it continued through-
out the nineteenth century, with the Court generally deferring to Congress’s
exercise of power, and the Tenth Amendment serving only as a toothless
reminder to Congress not to overstep its bounds.
ii. Lochner Era
In the late nineteenth century, the Court’s view of Congress’s commerce
power began to narrow significantly.150 At the same time, its view of the Tenth
139 The state of Maryland argued that it had authority to tax the national bank. Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 374.
142 Id. at 405.
143 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 239–40 (1824).
144 See id. at 198–99.
145 Id. at 198.
146 Id. at 187–88.
147 Id. at 196.
148 Id. at 196, 198.
149 Instead, Marshall supposed that the only limitations on the abuse of congressional
authority were “[t]he wisdom and the discretion of Congress” itself and the influence of
constituent voters. Id. at 197.
150 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 324. This characterization perhaps generalizes too
much and glosses over cases, such as Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321,
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Amendment expanded to embrace the “zone” concept of state sovereignty,
using it as a means to strike down numerous laws as unconstitutionally intru-
sive.151 This view continued throughout—and indeed helps define—the “Loch-
ner era.”
The first sign of this shift to the zone concept came in 1895 when Chief
Justice Fuller, in U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co., emphasized the notion that federal
authority cannot extinguish a state’s “police” powers:
It cannot be denied that the power of a state to protect the lives, health, and
property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and the public morals, “the power
to govern men and things within the limits of its dominion,” is a power originally and
always belonging to the states, not surrendered by them to the general government,
nor directly restrained by the [C]onstitution of the United States, and essentially
exclusive.152
Though the Court did not use the Tenth Amendment openly to preserve
the states’ sovereign powers, commentators recognize this decision as a water-
shed moment in its history.153
In Hammer v. Dagenhart, Justice Day, while nodding to the Court’s hold-
ing in Gibbons that Congress has broad power to regulate commerce,154 none-
theless found its efforts to foist child labor laws upon the states
unconstitutional.155 “The grant of authority over [interstate commerce] was not
intended to destroy the local power always existing and carefully reserved to
the states in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.”156 Put simply: Con-
gress could not prevent the states from executing their “police” powers.157
iii. The New Deal
This period of vitality for the Tenth Amendment was relatively short-lived
and came to an abrupt halt in 1941, with U.S. v. Darby.158 In Darby, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Con-
363–64 (1903), which upheld far-reaching federal statutes. See MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRY-
ANT, supra note 116, at 137–38.
151 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 324. See also MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra
note 116, at 137–38.
152 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895) (internal citations omitted).
153 MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 134–35. Again, this may generalize
too much, since the Court continued to treat the Tenth Amendment as declaratory in subse-
quent cases. See id. at 138–40 (discussing the following cases as treating the Tenth Amend-
ment as declaratory: Ames, 188 U.S. 321; McCray (Oleomargerine) v. United States, 195
U.S. 27 (1904); and Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911)).
154 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 269–70 (1918).
155 Id. at 277.
156 Id. at 274.
157 Id. at 273–74. Interestingly, during periods of Tenth Amendment power, the Court has
regularly turned to Gibbons for support of the supposition that, although the federal govern-
ment has exclusive power to legislate (i.e., commerce), the state may still exercise a separate
authority (a “police” power) even when these powers will impact the very thing over which
Congress has “exclusive” authority. Id. at 274. See also E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 12.
While Gibbons acknowledged the existence of indefinite “police” powers possessed by the
states, opinions that cite it in support of the protection of state sovereignty seem to overlook
Gibbons’ insistence that such laws “must yield to [the law of Congress],” in light of their
supremacy. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824).
158 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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gress’s authority to institute a minimum wage.159 The Court rejected an argu-
ment that Congress violated the Tenth Amendment by interfering with the
states’ authority to regulate business and returned to the view of Gibbons that,
“[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce ‘is complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than
are prescribed in the Constitution.’ ”160 As Justice Stone famously wrote:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surren-
dered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than
declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had
been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was
other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise
powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their
reserved powers.161
Justice Stone denounced Hammer explicitly for besmirching Gibbons.162 But
just as Chief Justice Marshall failed to do in Gibbons, Justice Stone did not
further address the obvious limitation on the states’ ability “to exercise fully
their reserved powers.”163 With Darby, the Tenth Amendment’s emergence as
an affirmative protection of state power was over, at least for a time, and it
returned to serving as an “exclamation point” for federalism.164 Over the next
thirty-five years, the Court invoked the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on
congressional power only twice.165 The most notable of these invocations came
in National League of Cities v. Usery.166
iv. National League of Cities
Interestingly, the Court dealt with the very same law as Darby—the
FLSA—when it once again employed the Tenth Amendment as an affirmative
limit on Congress’s ability to intrude into state sovereignty by imposing a mini-
mum wage on state and local governments.167 In National League of Cities, the
Court declared the federal law unconstitutional as impermissibly intruding into
“integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.”168 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, again nodded to Gibbons as establishing the
notion that Congress had plenary power over commerce.169 He noted that Con-
gress could even exercise this authority over “purely intrastate” activities that
affect interstate commerce.170 However, this time that power clashed with the
“affirmative limitation” of the Tenth Amendment.171 Justice Rehnquist rea-
159 Id. at 125–26.
160 Id. at 114 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196).
161 Id. at 124.
162 Id. at 115–17.
163 Id. at 115, 124.
164 MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 159.
165 Id. at 161.
166 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842–43 (1976). The other was Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970).
167 Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 835, 842–43.
168 Id. at 852.
169 Id. at 840.
170 Id. (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)).
171 Id. at 841.
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soned that, just as the legitimate exercise of congressional commerce power
may be limited by protections of individual liberties, such as the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a trial by a jury or the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause, so
too can it be limited by the reservation of state authority in the Tenth
Amendment.172
Rehnquist stressed that the Court had long acknowledged there were limits
to the authority of Congress to encroach on state sovereignty, even where it was
acting within its plenary powers.173 Therefore, while the FLSA’s mandate of a
minimum wage for private employees was a valid exercise of Congress’s com-
merce power under Darby and did not intrude into state sovereignty, it was a
different matter altogether when Congress attempted to aim its authority
directly at the states.174 For the Court, the crux of the matter was this: if federal
laws “operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral oper-
ations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the
authority granted Congress . . . .”175 The Court did not define what constituted
a “traditional governmental function”176 but offered a non-exhaustive list of
examples, such as fire prevention and police protection.177
For a short while, the Tenth Amendment appeared to experience a revival
of sorts.178 Ultimately, however, the undefined concept of “traditional govern-
ment functions” became National League of Cities’ undoing. After a series of
cases attempted, without success, to define what sorts of activities were imper-
vious to congressional power, the Court, in a 5–4 decision, explicitly rejected
National League of Cities’ holding.179
Returning once again to the same question regarding application of the
FLSA to state and local governments, the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority held National League of Cities’ concept of tradi-
tional government functions to be “unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice” and this time upheld the law.180 Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, lamented that courts could not pin down with certainty exactly which
state functions were essential to sovereignty or the criteria that made them
so.181 Even though he could not define its scope, Blackmun was quick to
acknowledge that “[t]he States unquestionably do ‘retai[n] a significant mea-
sure of sovereign authority,’ ”182 but only to the extent that they have not sur-
172 Id. at 841–42.
173 Id. at 842.
174 Id. at 845.
175 Id. at 852 (emphasis added).
176 Indeed, some have noted that even Rehnquist himself seemed to vacillate on what would
qualify. MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 182.
177 Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851 & n.16.
178 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 178; see also MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT,
supra note 116, at 178.
179 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
180 Id. at 546–47, 555–56.
181 Id. at 548.
182 Id. at 549 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (1983) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
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rendered it.183 The Tenth Amendment returned once again to serving only as a
reminder to Congress.
v. New York and Beyond
This time, however, the dormancy was short-lived. In 1992, just seven
years after Justice Blackmun abdicated judicial responsibility for enforcing fed-
eralism and left Congress to police itself, Justice O’Connor revived the Tenth
Amendment in New York v. United States.184 The New York Court expressed
an “anti-commandeering” doctrine that the federal government could not “con-
script state governments as its agents.”185 While this decision did not embrace
and reinstate the assertive “zone” philosophy of National League of Cities and
the Lochner-era cases (Justice O’Connor labeled the Amendment a “tautol-
ogy”)186 and did not deal directly with the issue of police power, it nonetheless
marked the quick return to the recognition that “[t]he Tenth Amendment . . .
restrains the power of Congress.”187
The Court has continued to maintain this commitment to preserving feder-
alism in subsequent cases.188 Two noteworthy cases are United States v.
Lopez189 and United States v. Morrison.190 Although neither was a “Tenth
Amendment case” per se, they both represent historically significant proclama-
tions of the limits of congressional power.191 In Lopez, the Court invalidated a
federal law prohibiting the possession of firearms in school zones as exceeding
Congress’s power over interstate commerce, reasoning that to permit such a far
reach would “convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States.”192 Similarly, the Mor-
rison Court, relying in part on its holding in Lopez, struck down a law provid-
ing civil remedies to victims of gender-motivated violence as violative of the
federalist structure of the Constitution and therefore beyond the limited powers
183 Id. This is consistent with Chief Justice Marshall’s proclamation in Gibbons. Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824). See also supra text accompanying note 149. Like Marshall,
Blackmun believed that protection of state sovereignty was a procedural matter, best accom-
plished through the political process, and was not an express function of the Constitution.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550–51.
184 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992). In light of her vigorous dissent in
Garcia, it is not surprising she took exception to leaving Congress essentially unchecked,
particularly given its “underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint.” 469 U.S. at 588
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
185 New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
186 Id. at 156–57.
187 Id. at 156.
188 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997) (also an “anti-commandeering”
case). See also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000), in which the Court expressly
preserved “the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment.” There, how-
ever, the Court distinguished the case and upheld the law, finding that the state government
had not been commandeered. Id. at 150.
189 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
190 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
191 See MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 199, 203–04. The cases also
demonstrate a willingness to define “judicially enforceable boundaries on congressional
authority.” Id. at 205.
192 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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vested in Congress.193 Notably, each of these cases emphasized that the Consti-
tution did not imbue the federal government with general “police powers,”
which were instead retained by the states.194 Those reserved police powers are
central to the supposition of this Note.
One final case is worth mentioning in the discussion of the evolution of
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Though it is still too soon to tell whether it
will have any lasting impact, 2011’s Bond v. United States represents a glimpse
into the modern Court’s understanding of the Tenth Amendment.195 It shows
that the Court continues to be committed to preserving federalist principles and
remains willing to limit the federal government’s overreaching (even if the
Court is equivocal on the source of the limitation).196
In Bond, the Court considered whether individuals have standing to chal-
lenge the validity of federal laws as violative of the Tenth Amendment (as
opposed to requiring states to raise their own objections). A unanimous Court
held that they do.197 While the Court did not reach the merits of Bond’s argu-
ments that Congress exceeded its own authority and intruded upon that of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Court’s examination of the role of the
Tenth Amendment and its embodiment of federalism is noteworthy. Justice
Kennedy acknowledged the ambiguity inherent in the Tenth Amendment’s
power: “Whether [it] is regarded as simply a ‘truism,’. . . or whether it has an
independent force of its own, the result . . . is the same.”198 Explaining the
Court’s stance, he wrote:
The principles of limited national powers and state sovereignty are intertwined.
While neither originates in the Tenth Amendment, both are expressed by it. Imper-
missible interference with state sovereignty is not within the enumerated powers of
the National Government . . . and action that exceeds the National Government’s
enumerated powers undermines the sovereign interests of States.199
The Court clearly took the position that there is a limit to congressional
powers when they clash with state sovereignty, even if noncommittal on the
source of that limitation. This is not surprising, given Justice Kennedy’s will-
ingness to limit Congress’s powers in Lopez.200
C. States’ Police Powers
The one constant throughout all of the Court’s decisions, regardless of
whether it was during an era that embraced or one that rejected the significance
of the Tenth Amendment, is the recognition that under our Constitution, the
states do retain significant powers.201 Chief among these—if not comprising
193 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18, 627.
194 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
195 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011).
196 See infra notes 197–99.
197 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2366–67. Subject, of course, to typical judicial requirements, such as
“actual or imminent harm that is concrete and particular, fairly traceable to the conduct
complained of, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 2366.
198 Id. at 2367.
199 Id. at 2366.
200 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
201 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 204–05 (1824); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1, 11 (1895); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273–74 (1918); United States v.
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them entirely—is the so-called “police power.”202 It is this power that this Note
argues gives states authority to jam cell phone signals, despite the lack of an
exemption in the federal law. As Justice Harlan noted in his dissenting opinion
in Lochner:
While this court has not attempted to mark the precise boundaries of what is called
the police power of the state, the existence of the power has been uniformly recog-
nized, equally by the Federal and State Courts.
All the cases agree that this power extends at least to the protection of the lives,
the health, and the safety of the public against the injurious exercise by any citizen of
his own rights.203
But despite the long-standing and central role police power plays in state
authority (recall that Justice Fuller remarked over a century ago that police
power is “essential to the preservation of the autonomy of the states”)204 a clear
definition of what it encompasses remains elusive.205
This difficulty in defining police power is due largely to its expansiveness.
As Justice Kennedy recently commented, “the powers reserved to the States are
so broad that they remain undefined.”206 Justice Rehnquist once referred to
police power succinctly as “the authority to provide for the public health,
safety, and morals.”207 But this definition does little to delimit the concept,
which is, in essence, the power stemming from the “residuary and inviolable
sovereignty” that states did not surrender to the federal government in the Con-
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976);
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 162–63 (1992); Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364; Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997); Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000). Even McCulloch,
which was not a “Tenth Amendment case,” acknowledges that “[t]he sovereignty of a state
extends to everything which exists by its own authority.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 429 (1819).
202 The term was coined by Chief Justice John Marshall in Brown v. Maryland in 1827.
Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
745, 745 (2007) (citing Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 442–43 (1827)). However, even
before the term “police power” came into being, the Supreme Court recognized the States
had “police” powers. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 208 (“acknowledged power of a State to
regulate its police”). Contrary to today’s understanding of the word “police,” which is
synonymous with law enforcement, the term at the time equated to “public order.” Legarre,
supra, at 760.
203 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
204 E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 13.
205 See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
2–3 (1904); DUBBER, supra note 134, at xi. See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62
(1872); United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
206 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967. See also FREUND, supra note 205, at 2.
207 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991). This echoes the definition Jus-
tice Fuller offered in 1895: “the power of a state to protect the lives, health, and property of
its citizens, and to preserve good order and the public morals.” E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at
11.
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stitution.208 Indeed, far from being surrendered, these are the very powers that
were “reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment.”209
The inability to define these powers has undoubtedly contributed to the
bumpy road the Tenth Amendment has traveled.210 Justice Blackmun’s deci-
sion in Garcia—a decision that marked a low point in the Tenth Amendment’s
strength—was based, in part, on the problem of discerning what constituted an
unmistakable object of state power and therefore beyond federal control.211 He
found the concepts of powers as “traditional,” “integral,” or “necessary” uncer-
tain in application.212 Nor could he identify any other “organizing principle”
with which to replace them.213 Accordingly, even though he admitted that
states retained unsurrendered authority,214 in apparent exasperation he struck
down National League of Cities as “unworkable” and left Congress to its own
devices.215 Had Justice Blackmun—or any other Justice who has ever had
occasion to consider the dividing line between the power of the federal and
state governments—been able to craft a “watertight, mechanical test[ ],” the
Tenth Amendment’s role might be clearer.216
Perhaps in recognition of the futility of the endeavor, the modern Supreme
Court rarely tries to define or explain why certain powers are police powers—it
just asserts that they are.217 The indefiniteness of such powers does not mean
that they are insignificant.218 On the contrary, they are among the most impor-
tant to society. As Justice Frankfurter noted of the authority of the states,
“[w]hen clear and present danger of riot, disorder . . . or other immediate threat
to public safety, peace, or order appears, the power of the [states] to prevent or
punish is obvious . . . because the preservation of peace and order is one of the
first duties of government.”219
208 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39,
at 245 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)). See also E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 11
(describing such power as “originally and always belonging to the states, not surrendered by
them to the general government.”).
209 New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
210 See, e.g., MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 133.
211 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539–40 (1985).
212 Id. at 546. See also MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 161 (noting that
“[n]either the Tenth Amendment nor any other provision in the Constitution attempted to
enumerate the reserved powers” and “[b]y instead relying on such extra-textual sources of
authority as perceived traditions . . . the Court all but invited the criticism that its federalism
decisions were . . . ad hoc and reactionary judicial policymaking”).
213 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 539; see also MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at
185–86.
214 MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 185–86.
215 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546–47.
216 William E. Leuchtenburg, The Tenth Amendment over Two Centuries: More than a Tru-
ism, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 41, 72 (Mark R. Killenbeck ed.,
2002).
217 DUBBER, supra note 134, at 153.
218 See MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 134.
219 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 316–17 (1941). See
also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
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V. CELL PHONE JAMMING BAN IMPERMISSIBLY INTERFERES WITH
STATES’ POLICE POWERS
It is unlikely that this Note will accomplish what 200 years of Supreme
Court jurisprudence has failed to do: identify clear boundaries of state police
power into which the federal government cannot intrude. Such a lofty achieve-
ment is not necessary for the premise herein, however, because there can be
little serious dispute that the law enforcement functions described above220 are
well within those boundaries, wherever they may lie.221 As the Court has
acknowledged, “[t]he promotion of safety of persons and property is unques-
tionably at the core of the State’s police power.”222 Whether preventing riots or
controlling unruly crowds, serving warrants or resolving standoffs, preventing
bombings, guarding its executives, or imprisoning criminals, when a state
undertakes any of these, it undoubtedly acts within the scope of its police
power to provide for public safety and the safety of its employees. One may
dispute whether cell phone jamming is appropriate in each of these circum-
stances, but there can be little debate that addressing such hazards is primarily
the responsibility of states and their local subdivisions.
The question then becomes whether, by preventing states from jamming
cell phone signals, even within the course of carrying out their police powers in
these situations, Congress has impermissibly interfered with them. Under its
power over commerce, Congress almost surely has the authority to regulate cell
phone signals.223 Even when calls do not cross state lines, such intrastate calls
are probably still within the ambit of Wickard v. Filburn’s aggregate reach.224
Nevertheless, as Justice Kennedy recently reminded, “[i]mpermissible interfer-
ence with state sovereignty is not within the enumerated powers of the National
Government.”225 So, while regulating cell phone signals under the commerce
clause may be within the federal government’s enumerated powers, to the
extent such regulation “impermissibly interferes” with police powers (the crux
of state sovereignty),226 the federal government has exceeded them.
220 See supra Part III.
221 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton) (“ordinary administration of criminal
and civil justice” are the “province of the State governments”); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (“areas such as criminal law enforcement . . . where States historically
have been sovereign.”). See also John Choon Yoo, Federalism and Judicial Review, in THE
TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 131, 164 (Mark R. Killenbeck, ed., 2002)
(“states would retain primary jurisdiction over . . . judicial administration and law
enforcement”).
222 Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976).
223 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–60.
224 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128, 133 (1942).
225 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011). In evaluating the current view the
Court takes on the ability of the Tenth Amendment to limit federal action, it is worth com-
paring Justice Kennedy’s position with Justice O’Connor’s in New York: “[w]hether one
views the take title provision as lying outside Congress’s enumerated powers, or as infring-
ing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is
inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution.”
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992).
226 See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895).
284 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:257
There is no doubt that the ban interferes with the states’ ability to carry
out their police powers—they are forbidden from jamming cell phones even if
they choose to do so. By preventing state authorities from jamming cell phones,
Congress has eliminated one viable option police would otherwise have for
addressing public safety exigencies. Therefore, it has interfered with their abil-
ity to exercise fully their powers. Given that it is clear the ban is an interfer-
ence, the question then becomes: Is this interference impermissible? I believe it
is for several reasons.
First, cell phone jamming is not the type of technique otherwise prohibited
by the Constitution and, because it is intrinsic to exercising police power, it was
not surrendered to the federal government. The authority to use it was therefore
retained by the states. Cell phone jamming is analogous to other, long-accepted
law enforcement techniques, as explained below. If Congress can prevent
police from jamming cell phone signals, then likely few techniques are immune
from congressional interference.
Second, the balance of governmental interests weighs in favor of the
states. The cell phone jamming suggested here is useful to the states’ funda-
mental public safety function. Yet it is so limited in scope as to be unlikely to
upset congressional efforts to regulate commerce. It is also unlikely to lead to
the sort of negative social conditions historically blamed on strong Tenth
Amendment rulings.
Finally, such a prohibition inhibits state experimentation in addressing
dangerous social ills. While the state experimentation doctrine is not crucial to
answering the question posed in this Note, it has long been a recognized Tenth
Amendment rationale. The federal ban on state and local cell phone jamming
precludes such experimentation.
Each of these is considered in greater depth below.
A. Not Prohibited by the Constitution
The states have broad discretion when deciding how to exercise their
police powers.227 The Tenth Amendment, however, expressly contemplates
that there are some powers (and therefore techniques) that states cannot use;
these are the powers that are “prohibited by [the Constitution] to the States.”228
Chief among the forbidden “techniques” police may not use, of course, are
those that violate other provisions of the Constitution. For instance, police may
not force their way into a home and search for evidence without a valid search
warrant because this would violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable search.229 They may not beat a confession out of a suspect
because this would violate that person’s Fourth Amendment right to freedom
from excessive force230 and Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion.231 They may not disarm the civilian populace to reduce gun crime because
that would violate the Second Amendment right to possess firearms.232 While
227 City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508–509 (1965).
228 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
229 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).
230 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
231 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003).
232 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3048 (2010).
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all of these might233 be very effective techniques, they are prohibited by the
Constitution. Cell phone jamming in the limited circumstances considered here
does not implicate such protections.
Instead, as noted above, cell phone jamming is analogous to other, long-
accepted (even essential) law enforcement techniques. For instance, in any of
the scenarios supposed by this Note, one could substitute police authority to
jam cell phones with police authority to control pedestrian and vehicular traffic,
even when that traffic includes business-related travelers234 (which would be
subject to Congress’s commerce clause power). In the face of demonstrations,
police can cordon off areas where citizens cannot go and generally limit free
movement to minimize the risk of violence, even if members of the crowd
happen to be journalists engaged in for-profit reporting.235 If police are prepar-
ing to serve a search warrant at a residence or have surrounded the scene of a
hostage-taking, they need not stand aside if at that very moment the FedEx man
arrives to deliver a package from another state.236 If a car bomb is discovered
alongside an interstate highway, the police surely can stop traffic while a bomb
squad addresses the device, even if that means interstate travel comes to a halt
while they do.237
In each of these scenarios, the commercial or interstate traffic that is
undoubtedly within the reach of the federal government must yield to states’
imperative necessity to deal with public safety. So too should cell phone traffic
yield when the demands of emergency call for it. If this is not true, then it is
difficult to imagine many techniques that are beyond the reach of Congress.
Consider that the dissent in Lopez failed the challenge to identify any activity
233 Or might not . . .
234 See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6109 (2012) (giving Pennsylvania local police authori-
ties the right to regulate traffic); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484A.420 (2011) (same authority
granted to Nevada local authorities).
235 See, e.g., Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739, 752 (6th Cir. 1999); Kevin Francis O’Neill,
Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 LOY. L. REV. 411, 513–20 (1999) (discussing
police power to regulate the conduct of a public demonstration); see also Robert Kientz, We
Have Reached the Breaking Point, FIN. SENSE (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.financialsense.
com/contributors/robert-kientz/2011/10/04/we-have-arrived-at-the-great-breaking-apart
(New York police, with the support of Mayor Bloomberg, arrested protesters and reporters
attending the “Occupy Wall Street” movement).
236 Perhaps because few companies would seek judicial review of police actions in situa-
tions such as this one, there are few court cases addressing police authority so exercised. But
see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704 (1981) (police can detain unarrested suspects
during the execution of search warrant; presumably then they can also keep people out). See
also Christine Clarridge, Seattle-area Police Train to Handle Events like Mall Shooting,
SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 12, 2012, 8:56 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/20198921
39_rapidresponse13m.html (discussing police training to handle hostage & emergency situa-
tions, including setting up a perimeter to keep suspects in and patrons out of commercial
settings).
237 I have been unable to find a case in which a business filed a lawsuit challenging authori-
ties for preventing the business’s employees or agents from passing near a site where an
explosive device was believed to be located. As a result, I am unable to cite to a case that
holds such police activity as within inherent police power. Nonetheless, blocking off public
access to the area surrounding such a site appears consistent with the inherent police power.
See supra text accompanying note 219. See also Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Beyond Pur-
pose: Addressing State Discrimination in Interstate Commerce, 46 S.C. L. REV. 381, 382–83
(1995) (“The Court traditionally has upheld health and safety measures . . . .”).
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that would be beyond Congress’s reach under its own, unhindered interpreta-
tion of the commerce clause.238
Similarly, an overly weak interpretation of the Tenth Amendment would
leave nothing to the states not subject to congressional approval. Could Con-
gress prevent police from using radios all together? Could it prohibit wiretaps?
Could it ban traffic stops on interstate highways? What about on all highways
where commercial vehicles travel? Could Congress prohibit police from carry-
ing firearms that have traveled in interstate commerce, or from using ammuni-
tion that has? Interstate commerce is implicated in virtually every facet of
modern life. Without some meaningful limitation on Congress’s ability to use
its commerce clause power to control states, it would be fair to ask whether any
powers are “reserved to the States.”239
B. Strong Interest and Limited Scope
As noted above, the history of the Tenth Amendment has been marked by
wild shifts in the relative strength of federal versus state power.240 The circum-
stances considered here, however, present no reason to fear “the hobgoblin of
the 10th Amendment.”241 Limited cell phone jamming by state and local law
enforcement agencies would not lead to the type of gross social injustices that
mark the “sordid past” of the Tenth Amendment,242 nor would it upset the
constitutional balance and cause an upending of national power.
Rather than embracing an interpretation that would permit a large-scale
impact in a state—such as that of the child labor law in Hammer or the mini-
mum wage in Darby, National League of Cities, and Garcia—this Note con-
templates instances of cell phone jamming that would be narrow and limited in
geographic scope to discretely targeted areas. Except in the case of prisons
(where it would be confined to non-public prison grounds), its use would also
generally be short in duration. Were this note to advocate for the power of a
state to, say, indefinitely jam all cell phone signals everywhere within its bor-
ders, such a position would almost certainly be indefensible. But there is little
likelihood that discrete instances of cell phone jamming in exigent circum-
stances will upset “the initiatives of the federal government to achieve social
justice” that marked early Tenth Amendment decisions.243 There are no sweep-
ing implications of the kind that lead to the “constitutional crisis . . . in the
1930’s.”244
The Court has shown a willingness to consider the relative weight of the
federal versus state interests when divining the line drawn by the Tenth
Amendment.245 This makes sense.246 The proper criteria for weighing those
238 See MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, supra note 116, at 202.
239 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
240 See supra Part III; see also BERGER, supra note 116, at 62 (referring to the Court’s
position on the commerce clause, to which the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence has been
tied, as “a shuttlecock that has been the toy of shifting majorities on the Bench.”).
241 Leuchtenburg, supra note 216, at 52 (quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter).
242 Killenbeck, supra note 117, at 8.
243 Leuchtenburg, supra note 216, at 44.
244 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 868 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177–78 (1992).
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interests, however, have proven elusive.247 Here, thankfully, we are not faced
with such an intractable dilemma. The balance weighs heavily in favor of states
because preservation of peace and order are central to state sovereignty and the
ability to jam cell phones bears directly on this capacity. At the same time, the
impact of such cell phone jamming would have little impact, if any at all, on
the federal government’s ability to otherwise regulate commerce.
The one major argument that opponents of cellphone jamming make
against it is not that it undermines the congressional regulatory scheme but that
it jeopardizes public safety.248 The FCC has repeatedly maintained that jam-
ming cell phones can interfere with “critical public safety and other emergency
communications.”249 This is likely true in instances of jamming by private citi-
zens, but the FCC makes this argument even in the context of governmental
jamming.250 This argument is essentially policy-based and bears little on the
legal basis of a state’s rights. Further, it is not clear the claim is wholly valid,
because the federal government’s own tests have suggested that cell phone jam-
ming can be accomplished (at least in prison settings) “without risk to Federal
operations.”251
The wireless industry argues that cell phone jamming can lead to
“degraded or disrupted wireless service.”252 Indeed, dropped calls can be frus-
trating, and quality cell phone reception is a legitimate end for congressional
regulation, but such interference would be occasional and confined to the area
where police were using jamming equipment.253 It is difficult to argue that this
outweighs the public safety need of the above-described scenarios.
First, consider the inherent condescension and contradiction in the position
taken by the FCC and the wireless industry. They contend that public safety
246 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 946–47 (1987) (providing an in-depth discussion of balancing in Constitutional
interpretation).
247 As Justice Blackmun lamented, such decision making “invites an unelected federal judi-
ciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.”
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985).
248 See infra p. 288 and notes 249–51, 253.
249 Press Release, FCC Enforcement Bureau Steps Up Education and Enforcement Efforts
Against Cellphone and GPS Jamming (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2011/db0209/DOC-304575A1.pdf; FCC, Public Notice,
Commission Seeks Comment on Certain Wireless Service Interruptions, 27 FCC Rcd. 2177
(Mar. 1, 2012) [hereinafter FCC, Public Notice].
250 See Barnett, supra note 43; FCC, Public Notice, supra note 249, at 2178–79 (Inviting
comment on service interruptions where a “government actor that exercises lawful control
over network facilities” deactivates it, but does not invite comment on “practices expressly
prohibited by statute or regulation, such as signal jamming.”).
251 See EDWARD F. DROCELLA, INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT FROM A
JAMMING TRANSMITTER ON SELECTED IN-BAND AND OUT-OF-BAND RECEIVERS iii (NAT’L
TELECOM-MUNS. & INFO. ADMIN. May 2010).
252 Statement on Press Conference in South Carolina on Cell Phones in Prison, CTIA THE
WIRELESS ASSOCIATION (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.ctia.org/media/press/body.cfm/prid/
2012. The industry also takes an almost “Chicken Little” approach to promoting the “safety
risks.” See Contraband Cell Phones in Prison, CTIA (Nov. 2010), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/
110510_-_Contraband_Cell_Phones_in_Prisons.pdf. This is presumably because safety is a
stronger argument than “dropped calls.”
253 See Hsu, supra note 86, at A02.
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would be put at risk if public safety agencies were allowed to jam cell phones
when those public safety agencies deemed the jamming necessary to protect
public safety! Beyond that, there is a legal basis for rejecting their insistence
that states should not be permitted to jam cell phones. The Court has recog-
nized that when it comes to the “domain of the reserve power of a State [the
Court] must respect the ‘wide discretion [the State has] in determining what is
and what is not necessary.’ ”254 Essentially, the federal government should not
dictate which (otherwise constitutional) techniques the states may use in exer-
cising their powers. Given that the technology would be used primarily in mat-
ters of exigency, the determination of whether cell phone jamming is
appropriate in certain circumstances should be made by those facing those exi-
gent circumstances. Certainly one factor public safety authorities must consider
when deciding whether to jam cell phone signals is the likely impact on other
communications in the area—including their own communications and poten-
tial calls for emergency service.
C. Experimentation
Though not critical to this Note’s argument, it is worth mentioning one
other, not-yet-examined, element of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence that
counsels in favor of the premise of this Note. Justice Brandeis is credited with
the idea that states can serve as laboratories for social experimentation and that
such experimentation is one of the goals of federalism.255 This idea continues
to have some vitality.256 While this is not the crux of the argument advanced in
this Note, the ban on cell phone jamming has directly limited state experimen-
tation with this technology in areas of their core responsibilities, particularly as
it relates to prison contexts.257 When states have sought permission to use cell
phone jamming technology to confront the real danger posed by contraband
cellphones in the possession of prisoners, they have been flatly denied.258 The
federal government has undertaken experimentation of its own,259 but if this
were enough to deny the states their own chance, it would “leav[e] the States
virtually at the mercy of the Federal Government,” undermining “their opportu-
nities to experiment and serve as ‘laboratories.’ ”260
VI. CONCLUSION
Cell phones are ubiquitous and may at times be misused with negative
impact on public safety and social order. For instance, they may be used to
254 City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508–09 (1965) (quoting East N.Y. Sav. Bank
v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232–33 (1945)).
255 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 111 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
256 See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
257 See supra text accompanying notes 98–101.
258 See supra text accompanying notes 98–101.
259 Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons Possible Wireless Technology Solutions, NAT’L
TELECOMMS. AND INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/2010/con-
traband-cell-phones-prisons-possible-wireless-technology-solutions.
260 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567–68 n.13 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
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coordinate riots, thwart warrants, prolong standoffs, detonate bombs, or permit
prisoners to organize additional crimes even while incarcerated. The state and
local law enforcement agencies that bear responsibility for addressing these
dangers could use cell phone jamming technology to mitigate these hazards
(just as federal law enforcement agencies already have the power to do), but
federal law prohibits it. This Note has argued that, to the extent the Communi-
cation Act of 1934 prohibits state governments (and their local subdivisions)
from jamming cell phone signals in these narrow law enforcement applications,
it unconstitutionally violates the federalism principles embodied in the Tenth
Amendment. This is so because the Constitution reserves to states a “police
power,” which they may use to maintain order and provide for the safety of
their citizens and employees.
While the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence has been inconsis-
tent, the Court has consistently held that the power to protect the public and
preserve order is at the core of those powers retained by the states. Recent
Court decisions addressing the Tenth Amendment have demonstrated a willing-
ness to limit the reach of federal power—even when Congress otherwise acts
within its enumerated powers—if it interferes with state sovereignty. Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lopez, a case where the Court limited the
federal government’s powers, could just as well have been written about the
prohibition against cell phone jamming:
While the intrusion on state sovereignty may not be as severe in this instance as in
some of our recent Tenth Amendment cases, the intrusion is nonetheless significant.
Absent a stronger connection or identification with commercial concerns that are
central to the Commerce Clause, that interference contradicts the federal balance the
Framers designed and that this Court is obliged to enforce.261
Because the applications of cell phone jamming described herein are
directed at narrow public safety goals, they are squarely within the exercise of
police power and therefore central to state sovereignty. Since it is not the type
of technique prohibited by the Constitution, and since these applications are so
discrete (limited in scope and, generally, duration) that they are unlikely to
affect the legitimate national regulation of commerce in a significant way, the
federal government may not prohibit state and local authorities from jamming
cell phones.
261 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
